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ABSTRACT

1.

This paper addresses the problem of detection and identification of sensor attacks in the presence of transient faults.
We consider a system with multiple sensors measuring the
same physical variable, where some sensors might be under
attack and provide malicious values. We consider a setup,
in which each sensor provides the controller with an interval
of possible values for the true value. While approaches exist
for detecting malicious sensor attacks, they are conservative
in that they treat attacks and faults in the same way, thus
neglecting the fact that sensors may provide faulty measurements at times due to temporary disturbances (e.g., a tunnel
for GPS). To address this problem, we propose a transient
fault model for each sensor and an algorithm designed to detect and identify attacks in the presence of transient faults.
The fault model consists of three aspects: the size of the sensor’s interval (1) and an upper bound on the number of errors
(2) allowed in a given window size (3). Given such a model
for each sensor, the algorithm uses pairwise inconsistencies
between sensors to detect and identify attacks. In addition
to the algorithm, we provide a framework for selecting a fault
model for each sensor based on training data. Finally, we
validate the algorithm’s performance on real measurement
data obtained from an unmanned ground vehicle.

As Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly
widespread in safety-critical domains, ensuring the safety of
such systems is imperative. Malicious attacks exploiting security vulnerabilities can have a catastrophic impact upon
CPS, thus undermining their safety. For instance, recent
work has shown that it is possible for an attacker to hijack
a modern vehicle through vulnerabilities in the vehicle’s onboard communication protocol [4, 16] or sensor spoofing [2,
21]. Furthermore, the worm Stuxnet was able to disable critical infrastructure by exploiting weaknesses in Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [6].
Since modern CPS are equipped with multiple sensors
measuring the same physical variable (e.g., GPS, wheel encoder and IMU can provide velocity measurements), a system can use the redundant information to defend against
malicious attacks. Fusing their measurements not only produces an estimate that is more precise than any single sensor’s [15], but it also increases the system’s robustness to external disturbances (e.g., rough terrain for automotive CPS).
Increased sensor diversity, however, leads to a greater vulnerability to attacks. While some sensors may be difficult
to get access to (e.g., encoder), others may be easy to spoof
(e.g., GPS [21]). Consequently, in this work we address the
general problem of developing a resilient sensor fusion algorithm in the presence of attacks.
The first consideration when designing a resilient system
is the sensor model. There are two main classes of sensor
models: probabilistic and abstract. In the former, each sensor gives a numeric measurement that is corrupted by noise
with a known distribution (e.g., Gaussian) [15]. In the latter,
an interval is constructed around each sensor measurement,
containing all points that may be the true value (e.g., set
membership methods [18]), thus being well-suited for worstcase analysis. Note that the abstract model does not make
any assumptions about the distribution of the sensor measurements or noise; however, the interval’s size reflects the
sensor’s precision - a small interval implies high confidence
in the obtained measurement. The abstract interval can be
constructed based on manufacturer specifications about precision and accuracy of the sensor, as well as physical limitations such as sampling jitter and synchronization errors [19].

Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: Unauthorized access
(e.g., hacking, phreaking); C.3 [Special-purpose and Application -based Systems]: Process control systems, Realtime and embedded systems

INTRODUCTION

In this work, we address the problem of CPS security,
which is usually concerned with worst-case system operation; hence, we adopt the abstract sensor model. There
has been much work on sensor fault detection and isolation
published over the last half century, with the vast majority
focused on scenarios with probabilistic sensors (e.g., see [5,
7, 8, 10] and citations within). This work differs from the
classical fault detection literature in the assumed prior information; classical approaches either assume a known sensor
failure model [22] (e.g., jammed actuator) or a prior on the
initial condition [11]. In the presence of attacks, such assumptions may lead to increased vulnerability [19], therefore
we adopt a more general approach.
Related to the work herein, one of the first works employing the abstract sensor model [17] considers the case where
some of the sensors might be faulty (i.e., outputting intervals
that do not contain the true value); it provides worst-case
analysis when the number of faulty intervals can be bounded.
An extension relaxes the worst-case guarantees in favor of
obtaining more precise fused measurements [3]. In addition,
intervals can be assumed to have a predefined distribution
on the true value so that again statistical analysis can be
performed [23]. Finally, an attack-resilient version of [17]
has been developed by introducing a sensor communication
schedule that limits the attacker’s power [12] and by incorporating measurement history into sensor fusion [13]. A primary shortcoming of existing fault/attack detection methods based on abstract sensors [12, 14, 17] is the unilateral
treatment of faults as attacks. Thus, these approaches may
lead systems to not trust sensors that were only transiently
faulty (i.e., that malfunction and provide wrong measurements for a small period of time) and not under attack.
It is important to note that transient faults may occur
during the system’s normal operation and disappear shortly
after. In fact, most sensors exhibit a transient fault model
that bounds the amount of time in which they provide wrong
measurements. For example, it is not uncommon for GPS
to temporarily lose connection to its satellites (or receive
noisy signals), especially in cities with high-rise buildings.
Similarly, a sensor transmitting data using an over-utilized
network (e.g., with the TCP/IP protocol with retransmissions) may fail to deliver its measurements on time, thus
providing incorrect information when the messages do arrive. Due to their short duration, however, transient faults
should not be considered as a security threat to the system.
In contrast, permanent faults are sensor defects that persist for a longer period of time and may seriously affect the
system’s operation. For instance, a sensor may suffer physical damage that introduces a permanent bias in its measurements. In such a scenario, unless the fault can be corrected
for in the software, the system would benefit from discarding
this sensor altogether.
Depending on the attacker’s goal, attacks on sensor measurements may manifest either as transient or permanent
faults. Each one has benefits and drawbacks – making a
sensor behave as if transiently faulty may prevent the attacker from being discovered but also limits his capabilities,
whereas a prolonged attack that is similar to a permanent
fault may be more powerful but could be detected quickly.
Since this work is a first step towards ensuring CPS security, we address the detection and identification of attacks
that appear as permanent faults – i.e., that do not comply
with the transient fault model. We leave the detection of

Figure 1: The proposed approach can be used as a front-end
detector to the actual sensor fusion algorithm by removing
compromised sensors that do not comply with the transient
fault model.
the more stealthy variety for future work.
Different from previous work, the main focus of this work
is the detection of sensor attacks in the presence of transient faults under the abstract sensor model. We develop an
algorithm that assumes a transient fault model (described
below) for each sensor and raises an alarm if the observed
sensor data does not match this model. In particular, we employ pairwise sensor relationships to develop sufficient conditions for attack detection and identification.
In addition to classical bounded errors, manufacturers
now provide transient fault specifications for their sensors [9],
consisting of three dimensions: (1) the interval size, (2) window size and (3) the number of allowed faulty measurements
per window. When such a specification is not provided, we
note that intuitively there exists a range of interval sizes that
match the underlying sensor noise model and a range that
matches the underlying fault model, i.e., sometimes sensors
provide measurements that are significantly farther from the
true value than noisy ones. Thus, we provide a framework
for choosing the three parameters in order to capture the
transient fault model but not include the noisy measurements. We illustrate this process using a real-date example.
Finally, we validate our approach on real data obtained
from an unmanned ground vehicle, called the LandShark [1].
We provide the algorithm’s detection and identification accuracy for three different classes of attacks and present the
corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
for different sensor models. In addition, we illustrate the algorithm’s advantage over the current approach in [17].
Note that, as shown in Fig. 1, the proposed algorithm can
be considered as a front-end procedure to the actual sensor
fusion algorithms described in previous work [12, 14, 17]. As
such, it can be used to eliminate sensors that are attacked
or permanently faulty before sensor fusion is performed [17];
our approach is not complete but is sound, i.e., given correct
fault models, it will not raise false alarms. On the other
hand, it provides no guarantees about the output of sensor
fusion in any particular round; bounding the performance of
sensor fusion given that the remaining sensors satisfy their
transient fault models is a topic for future work.
In summary, the contributions of this work are: (1) a
sensor attack detection algorithm in the presence of faults
based on the abstract sensor model; (2) a method, with a
real-data analysis, for fault model parameter selection; (3)
an evaluation of the fault detection scheme on a robotic platform in comparison to the approach introduced in [17]. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section provides preliminaries and formulates the
problem considered. Sections 3 presents our attack detection approach, and Section 4 illustrates it with an example.
Section 5 presents transient fault modeling. A robotic case
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Figure 2: Motivating example: where transient faults are
treated as attacks.
study evaluation is provided in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes this work.

2.

PROBLEM FORMULATION
AND PRELIMINARIES

This section describes the problems considered in this paper. It provides the system model used in this work as well as
the current attack detection approach. We explain its shortcomings and propose a way of eliminating them through introducing a transient fault model for each sensor.

2.1

System Model and Current Approach

We consider a system with n sensors measuring the same
physical variable. As mentioned above, we assume abstract
sensors; therefore, each sensor provides the controller with
an interval of all possible values. We assume the system
queries all the sensors periodically such that a centralized
estimator receives measurements from all sensors, and then
performs attack detection/identification and sensor fusion
(SF). We now explain the current approach to attack detection, referred to herein as a SF-based detector, before
providing the improved version addressed in this paper.
As described in [17], the abstract sensor model assumes an
error bound i for each sensor si , i.e., si ’s interval size is 2i .
(t)
If si ’s measurement at time t, denoted by yi , deviates from
(t)
(t)
the true value, θ , by more than i , yi is said to provide
a faulty measurement. Formally, this statement is captured
by the predicate F (i, t) of sensor index i and time t.
Definition 1

(Faulty Measurement).
(t)

F (i, t) ≡ |yi − θ(t) | > i .
Although θ(t) is unknown in general, one can derive an
interval that is minimal in size and guaranteed to contain
θ(t) by assuming that of the measurements of the n sensors,
no more than f are faulty at each time [17]. This interval is
referred to as the fusion interval. Since any point contained
in (n − f ) intervals may be the true value, the fusion interval is the smallest interval containing all such points.1 Any
sensor measurement that does not intersect the fusion interval must be faulty since the fusion interval is guaranteed
to contain the true value [17]. Thus, the SF-based detection algorithm built on the abstract sensor model identifies
sensors not intersecting the fusion interval as compromised,
i.e., attacked or permanently faulty.

2.2

Motivation and Example

Figure 2 illustrates the sensor fusion algorithm for three
rounds assuming a maximum of 1 compromised sensor per
1

Note that the fusion interval can be bounded when f <
dn/2e [17].

round (f = 1). Applying the SF-based detection algorithm,
sensor 4 is declared compromised at time t = 1 since it
does not overlap the fusion interval; similarly, s2 and s3
are declared compromised at t = 2 and t = 3, respectively.
Suppose, however, that each sensor is known to occasionally
provide faulty measurements (e.g., GPS in a tunnel), such
that it may provide at most 1 faulty measurement in any
window of size 3. Each of s2 , s3 and s4 satisfy this criterion
in Figure 2. In the presence of these transient faults, the
SF-based detector declares all faults as malicious attacks.
Motivated by recent manufacturer trends to provide faultymeasurements-per-window specification for sensors, we aim
to incorporate a transient fault model for each sensor to
improve the overall system performance.

2.3

Transient Fault Model

A transient fault model for sensor si is a triple (i , ei , wi )
where i is the error bound, and (ei , wi ) is a transient threshold specifying that si can provide at most ei faulty measurements in any window of size wi . The transient threshold is
used to define the boundary between transient faults and
non-transient faults. If si violates its transient threshold,
it is said to be non-transiently faulty, denoted by predicate
N T F (i, t).
Definition 2

(Non-Transiently Faulty Sensor).


t
X
N T F (i, t) ≡ 
F1 (i, t0 ) > ei ,
t0 =t−wi +1

where F1 (i, t) = 1 if F (i, t), and F1 (i, t) = 0 if ¬F (i, t).
Note that sensors may be non-transiently faulty due to either permanent faults or sensor attacks; the above definition
captures both of these scenarios. Of course, there might also
be attacks that comply with the transient fault model. As
described in the introduction, in this work we only consider
attacks that manifest as non-transient faults and defer the
analysis of other attacks for future work.
Consequently, permanent faults and attacks are both formalized as non-transient faults, and hence we treat them
in the same way. Therefore, if sensor si is non-transiently
faulty at least one time during the whole system operation,
we say that si is attacked. Predicate A(i) formally defines
attacked sensors.
Definition 3

(Attacked Sensor).
A(i) ≡ ∃t ≤ T, N T F (i, t),

where T is the total time of the system’s operation.

2.4

Problem Statements

There are three problems addressed in this work. For the
first we note that while transient fault models may exist for
certain systems, in general they are unknown, and it is not
straightforward to develop them. Thus the first problem is
the following:
Problem 1. Given a system with n sensors and a set of
training measurement data, develop a transient fault model
for each sensor si .
Once such models have been derived, we develop an algorithm that uses them in order to detect and identify sensor
attacks while the system is operating.

Problem 2. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (i , ei , wi ) for each sensor, develop an algortihm to detect the existence of an attacked sensor.
Problem 3. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (i , ei , wi ) for each sensor, develop an algorithm to identify which sensor is attacked.
For Problem 3, we assume that there are at most a attacked sensors, but do not limit the number of faults at
a round unlike the current abstract sensor fusion approach.
Naturally, Problem 3 (i.e., identification) is harder than Problem 2 (i.e., detection) since obtaining a positive solution for
identification also provides a solution for detection, but not
vice versa. Yet, even if they cannot isolate the attacked sensor, systems could still benefit from the knowledge that an
attack is present; therefore, both the detection and identification problems are addressed in this work.

3.

A SOUND ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

This section describes our Pairwise Inconsistency (PI) approach to the sensor attack detection and identification problems. Note that in this section we assume that a transient
fault model has been provided for each sensor and discuss
how to derive such a model in Section 5. Motivated by the
example in Figure 2, we aim to develop an attack detection
and identification approach that can differentiate between
those sensors which are attacked and those which are merely
transiently faulty.
The key concepts in the following approach are two types
of pairwise inconsistencies between sensors: weak inconsistency and strong inconsistency. We accumulate the information of strong inconsistency over time and use it for attack detection and identification. The following subsections
first define weak and strong inconsistencies, then formally
presents our attack detection and attack identification methods.

3.1

Weak and Strong Inconsistency

This section is built on the premise that the true value is
not known in general, hence it is not known which sensors
have provided correct measurements. What is known, however, is how sensor measurements relate to each other, and
it is this mutual information that is used in this work.
The first relationship between two sensors, si and sj , is
weak inconsistency, denoted by the predicate W I(i, j, t).
Two sensors are weakly inconsistent in a given round if and
only if one of them provides a faulty measurement.
Definition 4

(Weak Inconsistency).

W I(i, j, t) ≡ F (i, t) ∨ F (j, t).
Note that this condition is not possible to verify in general
since the true value is not known. Yet, there exists a useful sufficient condition for weak inconsistency, which is the
essence of this work. In particular, if two sensors’ intervals
do not intersect with each other, then one of them must have
provided a faulty measurement, since the true value cannot
lie in both. This is formally stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given i, j and t,
(t)
|yi

−

(t)
yj |

> i + j =⇒ W I(i, j, t)

Proof. Assume for a contradiction that both si and sj
provide non-faulty measurements at time t, i.e., there exists
(t)
(t)
θ(t) satisfying |yi − θ(t) | ≤ i and |yj − θ(t) | ≤ j . This
implies that
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

|yi − yj | = |(yi − θ(t) ) − (yj − θ(t) )| ≤
(t)

(t)

|yi − θ(t) | + |yj − θ(t) | ≤ i + j
which contradicts the premise of the Lemma statement.
As discussed in Section 2.2, transient faults and attacks
may both manifest as weak inconsistencies in a single round.
Therefore, we introduce a strong inconsistency to disambiguate between the two. A strong inconsistency exists between two sensors if and only if one is non-transiently faulty
(i.e., one sensor does not match its transient fault model).
Formally,
Definition 5

(Strong Inconsistency).

SI(i, j, t) ≡ N T F (i, t) ∨ N T F (j, t)
Similar to W I, strong inconsistencies cannot be verified in
general. However, again a sufficient condition exists. In particular, if two sensors are weakly inconsistent too frequently
in a given window, they become strongly inconsistent.
Lemma 2. Given i, j, t,
0
tX
=t

W I1 (i, j, t0 ) > ei + ej =⇒ SI(i, j, t)

t0 =t−min(wi ,wj )+1

Proof. Note that a weak inconsistency at time t0 implies at least one sensor provides a faulty measurement at
t0 , hence the premise implies that the number of faulty measurements in both sensors combined is also greater than
ei + ej . This means that, in a window of size min(wi , wj ),
either si has at least ei faulty measurements or sj has at
least ej faulty measurements. In turn, this implies that one
of them must be non-transiently faulty.
The pairwise notions on inconsistency discussed in this
subsection provide a basis for the attack detection and attack identification approaches presented in the following subsections.

3.2

Attack Detection

In this subsection, we present our approach to attack detection by employing the inconsistency notions above. The
attack detection approach developed herein only concerns
detecting the existence of a sensor attack and does not consider the (harder) problem of which sensors are attacked,
which is addressed in the following subsection. In words,
our detection algorithm declares that there is an attacked
sensor if a strong inconsistency between any two sensors has
ever occurred. The remainder of this subsection formalizes
the attack detector.
In order to monitor whether a strong inconsistency has
ever occurred, we employ a sequential detection approach [20]
and accumulate the information of strong inconsistency over
time. We use the predicate SI ∗ (i, j) to denote that there
exists a time t ≤ T in which sensors si and sj are strongly
inconsistent. Formally,
Definition 6

(Accumulated SI).
∗

SI (i, j) ≡ ∃t ≤ T, SI(i, j, t),
where T is the total time of the system’s operation.

Employing SI ∗ , we can formally describe attacks, as shown
below.

t=1

Lemma 3. Given si , sj
SI ∗ (i, j) =⇒ A(i) ∨ A(j)
Proof. From the definition,
SI ∗ (i, j) ≡ ∃t, (N T F (i, t) ∨ N T F (j, t)). This implies
(∃t, N T F (i, t)) ∨ (∃t, N T F (j, t)) =⇒ A(i) ∨ A(j).
To simplify the problem analysis and for better illustration, we observe that the pairwise relationship between sensors can be represented in a graph, where each sensor corresponds to a node, and an edge is added between two nodes if
there exists an inconsistency between them. Consequently,
the attack detection problem reduces to a graph problem
over an inconsistency graph.
Definition 7 (Inconsistency Graph). The inconsistency graph G(V, E) is an undirected graph where
• V = the set of all sensor indices {1, ..., n}
• E = {(i, j) | SI ∗ (i, j)}
Thus, a sensor attack is detected whenever an edge exists in
the inconsistency graph, i.e., there exists a strongly inconsistent pair of sensors.
Theorem 1. E 6= ∅ =⇒ ∃i : A(i).
Proof. Since E 6= ∅, there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ E. This
implies SI ∗ (i, j) by Lemma 3.
Having described the properties of the inconsistency graph,
we utilize it in the following section to formalize the attack
identification approach.

3.3

Attack Identification

We now consider the attack identification problem. To
perform identification, we require the additional assumption
that at most a < n − 1 sensors are attacked during system
execution. Note that a can be as large as n − 2 but it cannot
be either n − 1 or n since in those cases even if the inconsistency graph is a clique, one would be not able to identify
which sensors are attacked.
Assuming a < n − 1, one may derive a sufficient condition
for a sensor attack as follows. Suppose sensor si is strongly
inconsistent with more than a other sensors. In this case,
we can identify si as attacked; for if not, then all sensors
which are strongly inconsistent with si must be attacked.
However, the number of attacked sensors in this case would
be greater than a, thus contradicting the assumption of at
most a attacked sensors.
Theorem 2. Let deg(i) denote the degree of a vertex i
in graph G. Given i,
deg(i) > a =⇒ A(i)
Proof. Let sensor si be the sensor which is connected
to d > a other sensors in the inconsistency graph. Suppose that si is not attacked. It follows that the d sensors
which are connected to sensor i must be attacked. This is a
contradiction because there are at most a attacks.
The attack detection and identification approach presented
in this section provides a sufficient condition for the existence and isolation of sensor attacks. The following section
illustrates various features through the use of pedagogic examples.
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Figure 3: Motivating example revisited: where transient
faults are not treated as attacks.

4.

ATTACK DETECTION EXAMPLES

To illustrate the PI-based attack detection and identification approach, this section provides examples highlighting
various features. In the following, we first revisit the motivating example from Section 2, then present a more involved
example illustrating the nuances of the attack detection and
identification approach.

4.1

Transient Fault Example: Revisited

We begin by reconsidering the motivating example in Figure 2 with respect to the PI-based attack detection and identification strategy presented in this work. The results are
shown in Figure 3, where we recall that the transient fault
model for each sensor si is assumed to be ei = 1 and wi = 3.
In Figure 3, we visualize weak (and strong, respectively) inconsistencies as solid edges in the W I (SI ∗ ) graphs. We observe that one sensor is weakly inconsistent with the other
three sensors at each time step: s4 at t = 1; s2 at t = 2;
and s3 at t = 3. While the SF-based approach detects an
attack at t = 1 based on the weak inconsistency, the PIbased approach does not alarm since all faults are transient.
In particular, the sum of weak inconsistencies between any
pair of nodes is at most 2, hence the attack detection (and
identification) approach presented in this section does not
detect an attack, i.e., there are no edges in the SI ∗ graphs.
This example illustrates that the PI-based approach is
robust to transient faults and is conservative in the sense
that an alarm is raised only if the measurements cannot be
explained as transient faults. However, the lowered false
alarm rate does not come at the cost of a decreased attack
detection (and identification) rate, as the following example
describes.

4.2

Attack with Transient Faults Example

To illustrate the detection and identification scheme used
in this paper we utilize the fabricated example shown in Fig. 4.
We consider a system with 5 sensors over 6 time steps. Suppose that sensors 3 and 4 are under attack; the transient
fault model for each sensor is given as shown in Table 1.
Additionally, we assume that there is a maximum of 2 attacked sensors. In Fig. 4, the vertical dotted lines indicate
the true values (unknown to the attack detection system).
At time 1, the intervals of sensors s1 and s3 are disjoint
implying that at least one of the two sensors must have provided a faulty measurement (weak inconsistency). Similarly,
we detect 5 weak inconsistencies in total at time 1 such as
(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), as shown in the W I graph.
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Figure 4: An example showing the detection and identification capabilities of the algorithm proposed in this paper. Dashed
edges in the SI ∗ graphs indicated edges that were drawn in previous rounds.
Table 1: Transient fault models for the sensors used in the
larger example in Section 4.
Sensor
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

(i , ei , wi )
(1,1,6)
(1,2,5)
(1,1,4)
(1,2,6)
(1,1,5)

More weak inconsistencies are detected at times 2 and 3. At
t = 3, however, we conclude s1 and s3 are strongly inconsistent because they have been weakly inconsistent three times
in a window of size three, which satisfies the sufficient condition described in Lemma 2. Thus, an edge is drawn in the
SI ∗ graph (note that dashed lines indicate edges that were
drawn in previous rounds). Further strong inconsitencies,
namely (3,5) and (2,4) are identified at times 4 and 5, using
the same reasoning.
At t = 6, we add the strong inconsistency between s2 and
s3 , which allows us to identify s3 as attacked. To do so, we
utilize Theorem 2; node 3 now has degree 3, which is more
than the number of assumed attacked sensors, i.e., 2, hence
s3 must be attacked. Furthermore, by removing s3 from the
graph and updating the assumption a from 2 to 1, we can
also identify s4 as attacked, due to its 2 edges.
This example describes a toy scenario for attack detection
and identification. It illustrates that the PI-based detector not only reduces the number of false alarms but is also
able to detect and identify attacks. Further evaluation is
performed in Section 6.

5.

TRANSIENT FAULT MODELING

The PI-based attack detection and identification algorithm
requires accurate transient fault models. As argued in Section 2, modern manufacturers are transitioning towards providing transient fault specifications for their sensors as that
allows them to perform more sophisticated analysis [9]. However, if such a model is not provided or the sensor is operated
in unfavorable environments (e.g., using a GPS while surrounded by tall buildings), it may be necessary to develop
transient fault models based on empirical data. Thus, this
section presents parameter constraints governing the feasi-

bility of the attack detection and identification approach
presented in Section 3, as well as introduces a parameter
selection procedure to specify sensor-specific transient fault
models.

5.1

Transient Fault Parameter Constraints

In this subsection, we provide theoretical bounds on the
transient fault model parameters constraining the feasibility and performance of the detection and identification approach described above. For sequential detectors, an important measure of performance is the time-to-detection, which
is the time that elapses from the onset of an event (attack)
until it is detected [20]. The time-to-detection of the attack
detector presented in this section depends on the number
of faults allowed for the different sensors in a window. We
let E denote (e1 , e2 , ..., en ) and find a lower bound on the
time-to-detection based on E.
Lemma 4. Let ep1 and ep2 be the two smallest numbers in
E (with corresponding sensors sp1 and sp2 ). If ep1 +ep2 ≥ T ,
then no attack can be detected by the proposed algorithm (T
is the system’s total operation time).
Proof. Note that the premise implies that no strong inconsistencies can be found. This is true because even if sp1
and sp2 are weakly inconsistent in each round, it is possible that the measurements of sp1 were faulty in the first ep1
rounds and correct in the remaining ones, while the measurements of sp2 were correct initially and faulty in the last ep2
rounds. In this way both sensors would be within their transient fault models, and one cannot conclude that a strong
inconsistency (hence, attack) exists.
Since ep1 and ep2 are the smallest bounds on the number
of faulty measurements, by using the same argument one
can show that no strong inconsistency can exist between
any pair of sensors.
The previous lemma provides a global result regarding
the minimum time to detection. While this result relates the
number of faults to time, the premise can always be satisfied
by allowing a longer operation time. A similar bound exists
relating the transient fault model window and the number
of faults allowed, which provides a sufficient condition for
the impossibility of a strong inconsistency being detected.
Lemma 5. For any distinct i and j, if ei +ej ≥ min(wi , wj ),
no attack can be detected.

Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.
The theoretical bounds developed in this subsection constrain our fault parameter selection approach, which is presented in the following subsection.

5.2

Transient Fault Parameter Selection

When transient fault models are unavailable or unreliable,
it is necessary to identify such a model for use in the attack
detection approach. Different from algorithms using probabilistic sensors, algorithms over abstract sensor models require that the true value be always contained in the interval,
except in the case of a faulty measurement. Thus, statistical approaches to fault parameter selection (e.g., the best-fit
Poisson process) are unsuitable since they estimate parameters to be the ones that maximally explain the data, and
not provide worst-case bounds. Therefore, in this section,
we present a new method for selecting the transient fault
model parameters for the purposes of abstract sensor fusion
and attack detection.
To empirically identify the transient fault model parameters for a sensor, namely (, e, w), we proceed as follows. We
begin by gathering training measurement data using known
values of θ(t) (e.g., by applying a constant input to an automotive CPS and adjusting for the bias in the input-output
speed relation). By examining the data and sliding a window of fixed size w, one can identify the worst-case number
of faulty measurements e in a window for different values of
.
Note that intuitively there is a relation between e and . In
particular, if we plot the proportion of the number of faulty
measurements in a window (e/w) against , one should see
a few patterns (a few such sample plots for different window sizes are shown in Fig. 5). First of all, there exists a
large enough  such that no faulty measurements can ever be
observed. As it is decreased, the number of faulty measurements should gradually increase. The rate of increase should
be relatively constant while  is in the range of the sensor’s
transient fault model, i.e., the interval sizes that capture
large faulty measurements. As soon as  is decreased past
a certain threshold, however, it enters the range of the sensor’s noise model, i.e., the range where most of the sensor’s
measurements lie. At this point (informally referred to as a
“knee point”), the number of faulty measurements increases
faster as  decreases.
Therefore, it appears that the knee points should be selected as the values for  and e. They are outside of the
sensor’s noise model so it will not be flagged as compromised when it is simply noisy; on the other hand, they
are also smaller than the sensor’s fault model, thus most
faulty measurements should in fact be declared as permanent faults/attacks. Therefore, for a fixed window size w,
the choice of e and  is governed by the knee points. The
selection of the window size itself will be discussed and evaluated in Section 6.
Having described expected trends and patterns in this section, we use real data from an unmanned ground vehicle to
illustrate the existence of these trends in reality.

6.

CASE STUDY

In this section, we evaluate the PI-based attack detector
through a case study on the LandShark robotic platform [1],
shown in Fig. 6. The LandShark is an electric unmanned

Figure 5: Sample plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against the error bound ().
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Figure 6: The LandShark robot.
ground vehicle, containing many sensors including two encoders for the left and right wheels, and a GPS unit. Each
of these sensors can be filtered to provide a vehicle velocity
measurement at a minimum rate of 10 Hz. Thus, we evaluate the detector by considering the detection of attacks
on the velocity measurements in the presence of real-world
transient faults (e.g., tire slip). Specifically, using the LandShark, this section discusses the selection of the transient
fault model parameters and evaluates the attack detection
and identification performance, respectively.

6.1

Fault Model Parameter Selection

For the purposes of evaluation, we select the fault model
parameters according to the approach in Section 5. Fault
model parameter identification is performed using 4 minutes of training data corresponding to 2400 measurements
by each sensor at 10 Hz. The training data is gathered by
driving the LandShark in straight lines at a constant speed of
1 m/s on surfaces including grass, asphalt, and snow, where
the environment provides potential for transient faults. For
example, the LandShark tires occasionally slip in the snow
causing a temporary bias in the encoder-inferred velocity until traction is restored. Using this training data, we obtain
the real-data equivalents of Fig. 5, as shown in Fig. 7.
Table 2 summarizes the chosen parameters for multiple
window sizes. Setup P Iw uses the window size w, which
was varied between 10, 30, 50, 100 and 200. Thus, using the
plots in Fig. 7 and following the approach outlined in the
previous section, the fault model parameters are obtained
for the different setups. For example, in GPS (Fig. 7c) for
a window of size 50, the knee appears about the point  =
0.19 and e/w = 0.18, which corresponds to e = 9. Note
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Figure 7: Empirical plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against the error bound ().
Table 2: Fault models for the sensors on LandShark.
Detector
SF
P I10
P I30
P I50
P I100
P I200

L. Encoder

e
0.26 n.a.
0.229
2
0.195
6
0.195
11
0.131
26
0.117
36

R. Encoder

e
0.32 n.a.
0.234
2
0.207
6
0.199
11
0.168
22
0.126
37

GPS

e
0.48 n.a.
0.295
2
0.19
9
0.19
9
0.19
9
0.19
10

Table 3: False Alarm Rate
Detector
False Alarm
Rate(%)

SF

P I10

P I50

P I200

0.06

0.64

0.00

0.00

that as the window size increases, the lines become smoother
and the knees are more pronounced – this means that in
general using longer periods of training data should yield
more robust parameters.
To compare the performance of the PI-based detector with
the existing SF-based ones, we note that interval sizes are
chosen conservatively in the regular SF model because it
is designed for the worst case. Thus, in Fig. 7 the smallest  is picked for which no faulty measurements can occur
(e.g., 0.26 for the left encoder); thus, it is equivalent to P I1 .
This is another reason to introduce a PI-detector – it allows
for smaller interval sizes, resulting in more precise estimates.

6.2

Detection Performance

In this subsection, we evaluate the detectors’ performance
for the fault model parameters selected above using the
LandShark robot in the presence of multiple attack scenarios. To evaluate the performance of the detectors, we gathered sensor data from 17 runs of the LandShark where all
three sensors were sampled at 10 Hz for 50 seconds on average, corresponding to 500 measurements from each sensor.
Various attacks were then added to each sensor’s measurements as described in this section.
The false alarm rate of each attack detector is evaluated using the data for all 17 runs under no attacks, where
the false alarm rate corresponds to the number of incorrect alarms (i.e., since no attacks are present in the false
alarm rate test, all of the alarms raised are considered to be
incorrect) divided by the total number of tests performed.

Table 4: Detection Rate
Detector
Biased Attack
Random Attack
Greedy Attack

SF
62.74
4.91
0

P I10
99.74
36.10
0.4817

P I50
100
93.30
0

P I200
100
100
0

Note that the first test is performed as soon as w measurements are available; a new test, with a sliding window, is
performed whenever a new measurement is received from
each sensor. The results for the fault model parameters in
Table 2 are shown in Table 3 (P I30 and P I100 are excluded
for the remainder of the paper to avoid clutter). These results indicate that the false alarm rate is zero when w = 50
and w = 200 but is non-zero when w = 10 and w = 1,
i.e., the SF-based approach. The improvement in the false
alarm rate for larger windows is most likely due to the fact
that these are indeed transient faults, so they do not occur too often in larger windows. The SF-based approach,
on the other hand, has a low false alarm rate due to the
conservative way it selects the ’s; at the same time, it is
non-zero since the largest observed faulty measurement in
the training data was smaller than the largest one in the
test data.
To evaluate the attack detection rate, we assume the attacker can compromise only one (unknown to us) of the three
abstract velocity sensors and consider three types of attacks:
(1) bias attack; (2) random attack; (3) greedy attack. The
bias attack adds a constant of 0.8 m/s to the attacked sensor, while the random attack adds a uniformly distributed
random noise between 0 and 0.8 m/s.2 The greedy attack
replaces the abstract measurement with a new measurement designed to maximize the size of the fusion interval,
as discussed in Section 2.1.3 As formalized in [12], this is
a stealthy attack that aims to maximize the uncertainty in
the system. Note that the compromised sensor’s measurements are attacked in every round, hence every raised alarm
in these scenarios is a true alarm.
Employing the same data used to evaluate the false alarm
rate, augmented by the attack scenarios described above,
the detection rates are calculated for various fault models
as shown in Table 4. The detection rate generally improves
2
The magnitude of the attacks was chosen to be roughly as
large as the size of the largest sensor interval, i.e., GPS.
3
We assume the greedy attack knows the other abstract
measurements, as possible if sensor communication occurs
on a shared medium, e.g., CAN bus.

with the window size, except for the greedy attack where
almost zero detection is recorded; this shows that given
enough knowledge and computational power, the attacker
can mask his sensors as correct. Note that the SF-based
approach detected much less than the PI-based ones due to
the conservative way of choosing the sensors’ interval sizes.
While the false alarm rate improves with the transient
fault window size, for the same reason attack detectors with
large-windowed fault models may be slow to detect attacks.
Thus, it is natural to evaluate the detection rate (number
of alarms divided by the number of tests) vs. the elapsed
time since the attack onset. The detection rate vs. elapsed
time for the various fault models is shown in Fig. 8, where
the steady-state detection rates correspond to the values in
Table 4. We observe that for biased or random attacks, the
steady-state detection rate improves with the window size
and experiences only a marginal increase in the time needed
to reach this level of detection accuracy.
To provide a more thorough comparison of the various attack detectors and to examine their robustness to fault modeling errors, we varied the error bounds of the fault model
parameters chosen in Section 6.1. In particular, the ’s of the
three sensors were varied from 50% to 150% of their magnitudes in Section 6.1; we then calculated the false alarm rate
and steady-state detection rate for each setup. By studying the robustness of the attack detector with respect to the
transient fault parameters, we can qualitatively evaluate the
importance of accurate parameter selection. Over these new
model parameters we construct the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve, which is a classical measure of detector
performance, for each window size in Fig. 9.4
In Fig. 9, we note that data points which trend towards
the upper left corner denote a better detector, i.e., a detector with a larger detection rate and a smaller false alarm
rate [20]. One detector is more robust than another (qualitatively) if varying its parameters results in ROC data points
which cluster closer to the upper left corner [20]. Thus,
the robustness of the PI-based approach generally improves
with window size; we note that the performance of P I10 is
marginally better than that of the SF-based detector, but
for larger window sizes the benefits are clear. Finally, the
ROC curves in the presence of a greedy attack essentially
coincide with the 45◦ line, meaning that in the presence of
the most powerful attacker their performance is not better
than a coin flip.
The attack detection results suggest that the detection
rate, false alarm rate, and robustness of the PI-based attack
detection improve with window size, at a cost in time to
detection. Moreover, as the window size increases, the PIbased detector has an increasingly higher detection rate and
lower false alarm rate with respect to the SF-based detector.
Finally, we note that the identification performance of the
algorithms was almost identical to the detection one. The
identification rate generally increases with the window size
at the slight cost in time to identification. An avenue of future work is to explore under what scenarios detection could
occur without identification such that the attacker may remain stealthy despite the system recognizing that there is a
compromised sensor.

4
Only 13 data points are used to show the general trend and
avoid overcrowding on the plot.

7.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we considered the problem of detection and
identification of sensor attacks in the presence of transient
faults when multiple sensors measure the same physical variable. A novel approach to attack detection was presented
based upon transient fault models. When no model is provided by the manufacturer, we demonstrated how to obtain
such a worst-case model. The algorithm was evaluated over
a robotic application with real-sensor data that indicates
that there is a trade-off between correct identification and
elapsed time to detection.
Based on the evaluations herein, future work includes the
exploration of the qualitative relationships between various
parameters and the overall detection and identification performance in hopes of establishing quantitative design metrics. Additionally, we plan to incorporate the abstract sensor
detection scheme as a front-end to other resilient estimation
schemes in hopes of supplementing their performance and
improving their computational complexity.
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